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BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN MONOPOLY MARKETS: AUTOMOBILE 






O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar os efeitos da entrada de uma segunda concessionária 
de automóveis em mercados previamente monopolizados. Para tanto, construiu-se um banco de 
dados com a localização de concessionárias de automóveis em microrregiões e características 
demográficas e econômicas destas microrregiões. A partir desse banco de dados e de modelos de 
escolha binária, foram identificadas variáveis que condicionam a existência e o número de 
concessionárias em microrregiões. Utilizando-se de um modelo adaptado de Bresnahan e Reiss 
(1990), foram estimados os custos fixos de entrada de concessionárias em mercados 
monopolizados. Os resultados obtidos sugerem que as barreiras à entrada não são significativas, o 
que aumenta a probabilidade de que a cláusula de exclusividade nos contratos de concessão não 
cause danos à concorrência no mercado brasileiro de distribuição de automóveis. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effects of new automobile dealers’ entry in previously monopolized markets. To 
do so, we have used data on both the location of automobile dealers, and automobile demand and supply variables. 
First, we identify relevant variables which influence the existence and the number of automobile dealers in a 
geographical area. Then, using a model adapted from Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), we estimate the fixed costs of 
auto dealers and the marginal effect of the market size on the variable profit. The estimated results suggest that the 
fixed costs of entry of a second automobile dealer seem to be significantly lower than the fixed costs of entry of the 
first one and that the increase in the profit margin resulting from product differentiation more than offsets its 
decrease resulting from competition. This conclusion increases the probability that the clause of exclusivity present 
in concession contracts does not harm the competition in the Brazilian automobile distribution market. 
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1 1. .   I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n: :   o ob bj je ec ct ti iv ve e   a an nd d   r re ec ce en nt t   h hi is st to or ry y   o of f   t th he e   r re el la at ti io on ns sh hi ip p   
b be et tw we ee en n   a au ut to o   d de ea al le er rs s   a an nd d   m ma an nu uf fa ac ct tu ur re er rs s. .   
This paper investigates the existence of possible barriers to entry imposed on a second 
dealer in markets monopolized by a dealer of a specific brand, based on a model adapted from 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and on a database especially constructed for this exercise.  
During the nineties, we have witnessed a growing tension between auto manufacturers 
and retail dealers in Brazil, which resulted in a preliminary investigation by the Brazilian antitrust 
authority, CADE,
1 about manufacturers’ allegedly restrictive practices imposed on the dealers.
2 
According to Graph 1, the number of auto-dealers in Brazilian market increased from 2,604 in 
1990 to 2,996 in 1997, then decreased to 2,646 in 2004; the ratio between domestic wholesales 
and the number of auto dealers increased from 274 in 1990 to 649 in 1997, then decreased to 597 
in 2004.
3 
                                                 
1 CADE, the Brazilian antitrust agency, stands for the Portuguese acronym of Administrative Council for the 
Economic Defense.  
2 It is the preliminary investigation no. 08012.000487/00-40, of 2001. Please see Andrade and Alves (2001). 
3 ANFAVEA, 2005.  
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Source: based on ANFAVEA’s data (ANFAVEA, 2005) 
This tension can be associated to changes in the automobile retail business environment, 
which was influenced by a combination of two factors. The first is the technological development 
of automobiles, which reduced the importance of after-sales service and increased the economies 
of scope; the second is the advent of new information technologies, which among other 
innovations enabled sales over the internet
4. In Brazil, we have two additional factors. One is the 
revision of the Automobile Distribution Law (also known as “Renato Ferrari Law”) in 1990,
5 
which intended to allow more intraband competition among dealers, and the other is the arrival of 
                                                 
4 Please see, among others, the reports prepared by Price Waterhouse & Coopers (1999), McKinsey and The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2000), and the Consumer Federation of América (Cooper, 2001 and 2002). In Brazil, 
please see also Arbix and Veiga (2003). 
5 Law no. 6279/1979, named after the congressman Renato Ferrari, altered by Law no. 8132/1990  
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new auto makers in the second half of the 90s, which tended to increase both intrabrand as well 
as interbrand competition.
6  
Among other changes, the 1990 revision of the Ferrari Law revoked Article 14, which 
fixed the dealers’ margins; in Article 5, which governed dealers’ activities, it replaced the term 
“assigned region” with the term “operating area”, in practice allowing consumers to buy their 
new vehicles wherever they wished; on the other hand, the 1990 revision preserved the principle 
of exclusive distribution, which prohibited dealers from selling new autos manufactured by other 
makers (Article 3). Also, the partially changed Article 5 of the Ferrari Law has maintained 
“minimum distances between dealers of the same maker, established according to market 
potential criteria”. In the USA, the pertinence of these two vertical restrictions – exclusive 
distribution and territory restriction – still imposed by some states, has been challenged by some 
consumer organizations.
7  
In addition to this introduction, this paper is organized into four other sections. The 
second one briefly describes empirical studies of vertical competition issues found in automobile 
distribution. The third one discusses the Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) model. The fourth section 
describes the database constructed for this paper and brings estimated results for the Brazilian 
market. Finally, the last section summarizes the main conclusions and discusses the implications 
and limitations of the findings.  
2 2. .   V Ve er rt ti ic ca al l   r re es st tr ri ic ct ti io on ns s   i in n   a au ut to om mo ob bi il le e   d di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n: :   a a   s su um mm ma ar ry y   o of f   
s so om me e   e em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   s st tu ud di ie es s. .   
Among empirical studies on the competition aspects associated to automobile distribution 
and to the relationship between dealers and manufacturers, one can find the classic study carried 
out by B. P. Pashigian (1961), The Distribution of Automobiles, an Economic Analysis of the 
Franchise System, and Two Studies in Automobile Franchising, by H. O. Helmers, C. N. 
                                                 
6 Goldbaum (2005). 
7 Cooper, 2001 and 2002.  
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Davisson and H. F. Taggart (1974). More recently we have Franchise Regulation: an Economic 
Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, by Richard L. Smith II (1982); The 
effect of State Entry Regulation on Retail Automobile Markets, by R. P. Rogers (1986); and two 
studies by T. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss: Dealer and Manufacturer Margins, of 1985, and 
Entry in Monopoly Markets, of 1990. 
The Pashigian (1961) study is the most comprehensive. In addition to describing the 
relationship between dealers and manufacturers from a theoretical standpoint and detailing the 
auto distribution industry in the USA, the author suggests instruments to estimate the form of the 
dealers’ long-term cost function, in order to measure the occurrence of economies of scale in this 
activity. According to this author, knowing the extent of the economies of scale in automobile 
distribution would help establish, at least in part, the number of dealers that could operate in a 
given market, and consequently help us find out if competition among established dealers would 
take place on a price or non-price basis (e.g., services). Most importantly, it would also help to 
measure how open the industry would be to an arriving manufacturer. To determine how 
quantitatively important are barriers to entry represented by economies of scale in distribution, 
the author suggests a method to measure the relationship between the unit costs incurred by 
dealers selling vehicles and by manufacturers manufacturing them.  
Pashigian (1961) concluded that economies in distribution apparently extended beyond 
the point where economies of manufacturing had been exhausted, which would mean a 
substantial barrier to entry for new manufacturers.
8 When faced with the argument that new 
manufacturers (such as Volkswagen and Renault) enjoyed an easy and successful entrance into 
the US market in the late 50s and early 60s, a development which would disprove his analysis, 
                                                 
8 “Most authorities believe that production economies are exhausted once 600,000 units are produced. (…) 
Economies in distribution cost extend well beyond the optimum production unit. A company with 30per cent of the 
market has not yet completely realized all distribution economies. (…) A large part of the distribution economies are 
exhausted once sales reach 600,000 units. A new entrant retailing a low price auto, is not likely to be at a serious 
distribution cost disadvantage compared to larger producers once sales have been increased to 600,000 units. 
However, this represents 10 per cent of the market. It is unlikely a new entrant will succeed. (…) With the existing 
attachments of consumers to existing makes, it is unlikely a new entrant will be able to break into the low price 
market and boost sales to 600,000 units in any short period” (Pashigian, 1961, p. 263).  
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the author simply replied that the US manufacturers at that time had not perceived a change in the 
tastes of domestic consumers (Pashigian, 1961, p. 240). 
Smith II (1982) describes the dealer system used for auto distribution in the USA in the 
early 80s, pointing out the manufacturers’ need to control distribution. The author also built a 
model to test the hypothesis that government regulation tended to give existing dealers power 
over the local market by protecting them. To do so, Smith II (1982) estimated the optimum 
number of dealers per state, considering aspects that affected demand (such as the number of 
driver licenses, per capita income, driver density in the region, and unobservable license price) 
and supply (including, among other variables, those representing regulatory restrictions of the 
different US states), from 1954 to 1975. The author’s analysis suggests that government 
regulation apparently increased the dealers’ market power, to the loss of consumer welfare.  
Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) describe some “intriguing questions” seen in the US industry, 
such as the fact that the ratio between dealer margins and manufacturer margins is independent of 
the size of the vehicle and its price-elasticities and cross-elasticities. Based on the analysis of 
successive monopolies, the authors show that the ratio between the dealers’ and manufacturers’ 
margins is equal to the ratio between the slopes of the dealers’ and manufacturers’ demand 
curves. Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) defend four propositions: 
i.  In a price arrangement between the manufacturer and the dealer, involving only one product, 
if the demand curve is strictly convex (concave), the dealer’s margin on unit costs will be 
greater (lesser) than half the manufacturer’s margin. 
ii.  In a one-product price arrangement between the manufacturer and the dealer, the ratio 
between the dealer’s and the manufacturer’s margins is equivalent to the change in the dealer 
price when the manufacturer changes the wholesale price (the dealer’s unit cost), or when the 


















iii. If the demand quantity-elasticity is the same for all products, and their demands are 
independent, (i.e.,  () i i i Q D P = ), the ratio between the dealer’s and manufacturer’s margins is 
the same for all i.   
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iv. Finally, in a multi-product price arrangement between the manufacturer and the dealer, the 
ratio between the dealer’s and manufacturer’s margins for each product is determined by the 
quantity-elasticity of the demand curve η i
9. If the demand system is linear, the dealer’s 
margins will be half of the manufacturer’s margins for each product. If a proportional 
increase in all quantities raises the weighted impact of Qi on the prices of all products, then 
the dealer’s margin on the product i will be greater than half the manufacturer’s margin. 
Using data on production costs, wholesale prices, and resale costs and prices, the authors 
point out that more expensive models are subject to both greater discounts, on a percentage basis, 
as well as substantially wider margins. The authors conclude that the dealers’ margins are 
proportional to the manufacturers’ margins for the whole product line, and that we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the ratio between the margins is equivalent to one half, a situation that implies 
demand locally linear curves. 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) bring an empirical model of market concentration developed 
from an entry model based on the theory of games. The empirical model is built on inequality 
conditions that describe equilibrium strategies for entrant firms in simultaneous or sequential 
games. Such conditions are used to describe the entry into isolated monopoly markets. Based on 
estimations of the market size necessary to house one or two dealers, the authors conclude that 
monopolist dealers do not represent barriers to the entry of a second dealer. Moreover, the 
authors find that the entry of a second dealer does not provoke a significant decrease in the price-
cost margin. The following section describes in more detail the model developed by the authors. 
                                                 
9 ηi is not the slope of the demand curve, but rather a local measure of the curvature of the dealer’s demand curve, 
with a zero value when the demand does not have a curvature (i.e., linear demand) and constant value when the 
demand has the form of 
c bQ a P + = , with a, b and c constant.  
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3 3. .   T Th he e   B Br re es sn na ah ha an n   a an nd d   R Re ei is ss s   ( (1 19 99 90 0) )   m mo od de el l   f fo or r   e en nt tr ry y   i in n   
m mo on no op po ol ly y   m ma ar rk ke et ts s   
The model for entry in monopoly markets developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) is 
based on the theory of games, and is adapted from the individual qualitative choice model for 
firms whose profits and costs are not observable. The main idea is that a potential entrant firm 
will only actually enter a monopoly market if it expects duopoly positive profits. Unlike 
individual models, the decisions taken by firms entering a market are interrelated and their profits 
depend on the decisions of the other competitors. 
The authors assume the following demand function: 
() ( ) Y S P Z D Q i i , =  (1) 
where  () P Z Di ,  is the demand of a representative consumer for the product i. The scalable 
variable S represents the number of representative consumers, Z represents the market conditions, 
and P the price of the good i. Note that Z does not include S, which means that the size of the 
market does not affect consumer preference. The size of the market, in turn, is a function of Y, 
which represents demographic variables. 
On the cost side, the authors assume: 
( ) () () W F Q W c W Q C i i i i i + = ,  (2) 
where Qi represents the unit sales of firm i; ci(W), the variable costs (in which the marginal cost is 
constant); the vector W, exogenous variables that affect the costs (such as raw material prices); 
and Fi(W), the fixed costs. Inverting the demand function, one can obtain the following profit 
function of the potential entrant firm i, which depends on its production and the production of its 
competitors. 
() [] i i i i i F Q c S Q Z P − − = Π / ,  (3) 
For monopolies and most duopoly models, the profit, in equilibrium, increases linearly in 
S. Therefore:    
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i − = Π ,  (4) 
where N denotes monopoly (N=M) or duopoly (N=D). 
Figure 1 compares the market structure, defined by the profit of the monopoly or duopoly, 
to the size of the market. The curves define, in the horizontal axis market sizes that do not 
support any firm (between 0 and S
M), one monopoly firm (between S
M and S
D)  and two duopoly 
firms (to the right of  S
D). In this figure, S
D is on the right of S
M because the firm j has higher 
fixed costs and lower profits per buyer than firm i. Such increase in the fixed cost is the 
equivalent to including barriers to entry B. 






















Source: Bresnahan e Reiss (1988) 
While profits are not observable, the S
D and S
M break-even levels are. At S
M, the 











=  (5) 
Assuming that the barriers to entry faced by a potential entrant meant firm j’s marginal 
cost increase of b, and fixed costs increase of B, the size of the market that brings zero profit to 
the duopolist is the following:  
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The first term on the right side of the equation provides V
D/V
M, i. e., the ratio of the 

































M ratio decreases if post-entry competition increases j (i.e., if the price of the 
duopoly equilibrium decreases or if the production costs of firm j (i.e., cj+b) increase, which can 















=  (8) 
can also be estimated. 
Summing up, the ratio between the break-even points can be expressed as the product of 
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The Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) analysis uses variable profits and fixed costs ratios 
because the empirical data do not allow us to separately identify the individual components in 
these ratios. 
The entry model described above implicitly assumes a series of assumptions. For 
example, it does not consider the possibility of the existing monopolist discouraging the entry of 
new players by reducing the monopoly price when the market size approached S
D – which would 
imply a less steep slope of the monopolist's profits when S approached S
D. Overall, it omits non-
linear pricing strategies and asymmetric information, among other possibilities.  
Based on this model, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) use the firms’ equilibrium pay-off 
functions to formulate equations that describe optimal entry strategies. The entry is modeled as a 
binary decision that corresponds to two pure strategies: Ii = 1, if the firm enters, e Ii = 0, if it does 
not enter. Two potentially entrant firms face each other in a one-round game, in which each firm 
knows the strategies and payoffs of its respective competitors. The entry decision of firm 1 
depends on the entry decision of firm 2, and vice-versa. Both act in a non-cooperative manner, in 
two possible situations, when decisions are simultaneous and when they are sequential. However, 
in this paper we will only detail the situation of simultaneous decisions. 





2 forms Nash's pure strategy equilibrium if  






1 1 , , I I I I Π ≥ Π , for  {} 1 , 0 1 ∈ I , and 






1 2 , , I I I I Π ≥ Π , for  {} 1 , 0 2 ∈ I . (9) 
If a firm earns zero profit when opting for I = 0, then its optimum entry strategy will be 
the following: 






1 < Π + Π − ⇔ =
D M I I I , and 






0 < Π + Π − ⇔ =
D M I I I . (10) 
That is, a firm will decide to enter if, and only if, the profit of the monopoly or profit of 
the duopoly are less than zero.  
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Table 1 describes the other pure-strategy solutions, considering only that the duopoly 
profits cannot be greater than those of the monopoly. 
Table 1: Results of pure strategy in a game of simultaneous decisions 
0 1 < Π
M ,  0 2 < Π
M   No entrant 
0 1 > Π
D ,  0 2 > Π
D   Duopoly 
D M
1 1 0 Π > > Π , 
D M
2 2 0 Π > > Π   Monopoly of firm 1 or 2 
0 1 > Π
M ,  0 2 < Π
D   Monopoly of firm 1 
0 1 < Π
D ,  0 2 > Π
M   Monopoly of firm 2 
Source: Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) 
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), the first line of the table describes a situation in 
which no entry takes place; the second shows one in which two firms enter. The last three lines 
describe monopoly situations, the last two implicitly including the condition “and not any of the 
previous events”; the third line shows a situation in which there is no single result of pure 
strategy. 
The presence of non-unique equilibria in theory of games models prevents the use of the 
standard qualitative choice models to model the entrants’ profits. To get around this problem, the 
authors reinterpreted the model, to include N = I1 + I2, the number of entrants. Thus, the last 
three lines of the table represent a single result, N = 1. 
 
b.  Treatment of unobservable data 
On the other hand, to get around the problem of neither earned profits nor expected profits 
being observable, the authors model the firms’ profits as unobservable random variables, adding 
an error term in the equilibrium profit function (4). Specifically, the profit of the Nth entrant’s 
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− ⋅ = Π
 (11)  
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in which variable profits are equivalent to the sum of a measurable profit component  ) (⋅ V  and an 
unobservable component η. Similarly, fixed costs have a measurable component F  and an error 
term ε.  
In the econometric models the authors developed, the stochastic structure of (11) was 
restricted because of computational and economic conditions. For example, to prevent duopoly 
profits from exceeding the monopoly profits with a positive probability. The authors developed 
three models: (i) perfectly correlated unobservable profits; (ii) correlated errors; and (iii) 
monopoly and duopoly errors not perfectly dependent. In this paper we opted to detail only the 
first model, that in which the unobservable profits are perfectly correlated. This model 
presupposes that all potential entrants have the same fixed costs and unobservable variable 
profits, i.e.: 
D M D M
2 2 1 1 ε ε ε ε = = =  and 
D M D M
2 2 1 1 η η η η = = = . Although this error specification 
implies strong assumptions on the unobservable profit distribution, it presents two advantages. 
The first is that if the firms only have independent and identically distributed fixed costs, then the 
firms’ profit parameters can be estimated using an ordered probit model. Including an error term 
in the variable profits, we get a heteroscedastic ordered probit model, in which the variance of 
unobservable profits, 
2 2 2 1 S η ξ σ σ + = , increases with the size of the market.  
Thus, the probabilities associated to the observation of markets with no firms, two firms, 
or one firm are the following: 
() [ ] ξ σ / , , 1 0 Y W Z P
M
Π Φ − =  
() [ ] ξ σ / , , 2 Y W Z P
D
Π Φ =  
2 0 1 1 P P P − − =  (12) 
The model is estimated from equation (4), using data obtained from isolated markets in 
the USA. The specifications are summarized in equations (13), (14) and (15): 




DD + ZθZ + WθW, e  (14)  




DD + γWW (15) 
Where TOWNPOP is the population of the central city, Y are the other demographic 
variables, the superscript N can be M (monopoly) or D (duopoly), D is a dummy variable for 
duopolies, Z is a demand conditioner vector, and W a supply conditioner vector (costs). The 
results obtained in the simplest model, which excludes Y, Z and W, are shown in Table 2. 
As shown in Table 2, the ratio V
D/V
M measures the fraction by which variable profits per 
client decrease with the entry of a new firm. When duopolists sell the same product, V
D/V
M 
should be equal to (in the case of collusion) or less than (in the case of non-cooperative behavior) 
0.5. Since the ratio V
D/V
M observed in Brensahan and Reiss (1990) is greater than 0.5, (in this 
case, V
D/V
M = 0.752), the authors conclude that product differentiation increased the duopoly 
margin more than competition was able to decrease it. Consequently, “entry by a Ford dealer into 
a monopoly GM market would not lower a monopoly GM dealer’s sales and variable profits by 
much” (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990, p. 552). 
Table 2: Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), estimations based on the ordered probit model for the 
number of auto dealers. 








  + θ
D









  1.277 (5.39) 
Log likelihood   -123.76   
S
M   575  (188) 
S
D   1820  (166) 
S
M/S
D   0.316  (0.095) 
V
D/V
M   0.752  (0.180) 
F
M/F
D   0.419  (0.183) 
Log likelihood    -123.76   
Source: Adapted from Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), tables 5 and 8. 
In turn, the relation F
M/F
D suggests that the duopoly’s fixed costs are relatively larger than 
those of the monopoly. For a simpler specification, the results of which are shown in Table 2, the 
duopoly’s fixed costs are more than two times larger than those of the monopoly. In the other 
specifications, the proportion ranged between 1 and 1.5 times, approximately. The authors 
conclude that although the estimates suggest the duopoly’s fixed costs are larger than those of the  
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monopoly, these costs cannot be attributed to entry barriers. The estimations obtained from the 
sequential entry model suggested that, unlike the entry order, the fixed costs could vary, say, 
according to the brand.  
4 4. .   B Ba ar rr ri ie er rs s   t to o   e en nt tr ry y   i in n   m mo on no op po ol ly y   m ma ar rk ke et ts s: :   a au ut to om mo ob bi il le e   
d di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   i in n   B Br ra az zi il l   
This section analyzes the existence of barriers to entry into monopoly markets in the 
Brazilian auto distribution industry. To do so, we organized a database containing the location of 
all automobile and light commercial vehicles in Brazil in 2004, according to manufacturer and 
city
10. This information has been crossed with the municipal characteristics, obtained from 2000 
Census micro-data and aggregated into micro-regions, which, considering consumer mobility and 
production factors, are believed to provide a suitable analysis unit.  
The 2000 Census data were considered proxies for the characteristics of the micro-regions 
existing in 2004. No information on dealer location was found for 2000, and the available data on 
micro-regions for 2004 were not as detailed as those based on the 2000 Census micro-data. 
This analysis is subdivided into three sub-sections. The first analyzes the dealer location 
determinants in the micro-regions. The second analyzes the dealer number determinants in each 
micro-regions. The third uses the variables found in the previous sections to investigate the signs 
of the existence of barriers to entry into the auto distribution industry in Brazil, based on the 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) model. 
4.1  Analysis of dealer location determinants in a micro-region. 
To analyze the dealer location determinant factors, we built a binary choice model of the 
following type: 
                                                 
10 Data was kindly provided by Fenabrave, the National Automobile Distributor Federation. In the case of Ford, the 
auto and light commercial vehicle dealers also include truck dealers. Fenabrave updates this information every week. 
The file that generated this database is from 14 October 2004.  
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() () β β x G x y P + = = 0 | 1  (A) 
in which the variable y assumes the value of zero if no dealers exist in a micro-region, or the 
value of one, if there is at least one dealer. The independent variable vector x gathers 
demographic data, which condition the demand for automobiles and information on the cost of 
dealer installation in a micro-region. 
Alternatively, the model can be read to implicitly assume the latent (unobservable) 
variable economic profit (y*):  
ε β β + + = x y 0 *,   [ ] 0 * 1 > = y y  
The probability of an answer to y is: 
() ( ) ( ) [] ( ) [ ] ( ) β β β β β β x G x G x x e P x y P x y P + = + − − = + − > = = = = 0 0 0 1 | | 0 * | 1  (B) 
which is the same of the model (A). In the logit model, G is a logistic function, while in the 
probit model, G is an accumulated standard normal distribution function. Details on the binary 
choice models are found in Wooldridge (2002), Griffiths et al. (1993) and Cramer (2001). 
After preliminary analyses, the best results were obtained with the variables shown in 
Table 3 below, in which the first two are demographic variables, relative to market size; the next 
two are supply shifters; and the last three are demand shifters. The main statistics describing 
these variables are shown in Table 4.  
Table 3: Variables used in binary choice models 
Variables Meaning 
lnpop_1  Natural log of the urban population of the micro-region’s largest city. 
lnpop_2  Natural log of the remaining population in the micro-region (i.e., rural population plus urban population of the other 
cities. 
adens  Inhabitants per square kilometer. 
custof_rel  Average wage of workers in administrative positions employed in auto retail, divided according to per capital income in 
each micro-region, in R$. (*) 
lny_dom  Natural log of average income per household, in R$. 
Theil  Theil’s L inequality index, computed for each micro-region. 
Age  Average age in each micro-region. 
Note: (*) In the micro-regions with no workers employed in administrative positions in the auto retail, we used the 
average salary of the other workers employed in retail in that industry.  
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Table 4: Statistics describing independent variables used in binary choice models 
Variable Observations  Mean Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
lnpop_1 558  10.749  1.227  7.626  16.100 
lnpop_2 558  14.108  1.055  9.263  18.645 
adens 558  886.052  3447.441  2.308  5.773.77 
custof_rel 558  5.515  5.960  0.458  55.681 
Theil 558  0.537  0.077  0.334  0.852 
lny_dom 558  6.572 0.454  5.647  7.735 
Age 558  27.620  2.709  19.768  33.800 
Source: Based on Census data (IBGE, 2000). 
The results of the logit and probit models are shown in Table 5. In this Table we see that 
the demographic variables and those representing demand conditioners have positive signs, while 
those representing supply conditioners (costs) have negative signs. Specifically in regard to the 
adens (population density) variable, we believe that it is a proxy for the costs of property where 
the dealer is located. 
Table 5: Results of binary choice models 
Probit Logit 
Variables 
Coeff.  Standard 
deviation  dF/dx  Standard 
deviation  Coeff.  Standard 
deviation 
lnpop_1 1.292(***)  0.235 0.358(***) 0,063 2.272(***)  0.427
lnpop_2 0.883(***)  0.235 0.244(***) 0,066 1.588(***)  0.419
custof_rel -0.014 0.014 -0.0038 0,004 -0.0231  0.024
adens -0.0002(***)  0.00007 -0.00006(***) 0,00002 -0.0004(**)  0.0001
lny_dom 1.713(***)  0.339 0.474(***) 0,091 2.994(***)  0.606
Theil 3.618(**)  1.453 1.002(**) 0,424 6.624(**)  2.613
Age 0.298(***)  0.047 0.083(***) 0,0142 0.543(***)  0.089
Constante -46.663(***)  4.570 -83.077(***)  8.800
Log Likelihood  -119.732  -120.524 
Pseudo R
2 0.683  0.680 
N 558  558 
Note: (**) significant at 5%, (***) significant at 1%.  
All the variables are significant at 1%, except variables associated to income distribution 
(at 5%) and to labor (which is significant only at 35%). We also see no major differences 
between the logit and probit models, regarding the significance of the variables. 
The probit model also enables us to compute the marginal effects of the variables on the 
probability of a dealer occurring in a micro-region. The marginal effects are listed in column 
dF/dx; for example, the column shows that a 1% rise in the share of female population in a micro- 
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region increases the probability of a dealer existing in the micro-region in approximately 5%. 
Table 6 shows that correct percentages for both models exceed 90%, and that forecast errors are 
balanced. 
Table 6: Correct percentages of the dealer location models 








0 200  26  226    0  200  25  225 
Actual Location 
1 28  304  332   
Actual Location
1 28  305  333 
Total  228  330 558   Total    228  330 558 
Correct percentage  90,3%    Correct percentage  90,5% 
Source: own elaboration 
4.2  Analysis of dealer number determinants in a micro-region. 
To analyze the determinants of the number of dealers in a micro-region, we compared the 
results of two models. The first was a multiple linear regression model (in which the coefficients 
are computed using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method) and the second with a sample 
selection correction (Heckit model).  
The multiple linear regression model used as regressors a subset of variables identified in 
the previous section: 
age dom y pop pop q 8 6 2 1 0 _ ln 2 _ ln 1 _ ln ln β β β β β + + + + =  (C) 
The sample selection correction model used all variables identified in the previous section 
as variables, and only the variables used in the multiple linear regression model as regressors. 
The variables “lnpop_3”, “custof_rel”, “adens” and “Theil” were not significant enough to be 
included as regressors. 
[ ] age Theil dom y adens rel custof pop pop s
age dom y pop pop q
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
8 6 2 1 0
_ ln   _ 2 _ ln 1 _ ln 1
_ ln 2 _ ln 1 _ ln ln
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
β β β β β
+ + + + + + + =
+ + + + =
  (D) 
The compared results are shown in Table 7:  
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Table 7: Results of the dealer number determinants per micro-region models 
OLS   HECKIT 
lnq 
Coefficient  Standard error    Coefficient  Standard error 
lnpop_1 0.256  0.063    0.231  0,063 
lnpop_2 0.513  0.068    0.513  0,067 
lny_dom 0.626  0.098    0.580 0,100 
age 0.070  0.013    0.063  0,013 
_cons -15.166  0.754    -14.334  0,877 
sigma       0.475  0,019 
Observações  330    558 (330 selec.) 
F 261.610       
R2 0.763       
Log likelihood        -338.160 
Note: All coefficients are significant at 1%. 
All coefficients are significant at 1%. Particularly important is the significance of the 
value of the sigma coefficient, a sign of a problem in sample selection. The coefficients of the 
variables “lnpop_1” and “age” are those whose correction is proportionally higher. 
4.3  Analysis of the importance of barriers to the entry of new dealers. 
This third exercise investigates if the existence of a dealer in a micro-region represents a 
barrier to the entry of a new dealer in this micro-region. 
To analyze this matter, we extracted from the original database a subset of “non-shared” 
micro-regions, i.e., those which did not house more than one dealer of a given brand. This 
procedure produced a subset of 410 micro-regions, of which 228 (56% of the total) did not have 
any dealers, 52 (13%) had only one dealer, and up to three micro-regions (1%) had eight dealers 
of different brands, as shown in Table 8. 
The objective was to identify and segregate a subgroup of dealers that enjoyed market 
power in their operating regions, at least regarding intrabrand competition. We later limited the 
number of dealers in a micro-region to no more than two, which resulted in a subset containing 
313 micro-regions.  
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Table 8: Frequency of dealers in micro-regions, excluding shared micro-regions 
Number of dealers  Absolute frequency (micro-regions) Relative  frequency  (micro-regions) 
0 228  56% 
1 52  13% 
2 33  8% 
3 38  9% 
4 34  8% 
5 14  3% 
6 7  2% 
7 1  0,2% 
8 3  1% 
Total 410  100% 
Source: Based on Fenabrave data. 
The models built to measure the importance of barriers to the entry of new dealers is 
based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), the details of which were shown in the previous section. 
We used a reduced ordered probit model, in which the unobserved economic profit variable (y*) 
is specified according to the equation below: 
adens Theil cap y pop y 4 3 2 1 _ 1 * β β β β + + + =  (E) 
The dependent variables are defined and characterized according to the table in Table 9. 
We decided to use the variables in level, no in logarithm (except for the Theil index), to enable us 
to directly estimate the break-even points. 
Table 9: Variables used in ordered Probit model 
Number of dealers  Observations  Variables Mean Standard  deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
pop1  39,639.39 26,620.51 2,051 262,538
y_cap  146.09 79.95 46.25 601.37
l1  0.52 0.08 0.33 0.85
0 to 2  313 
adens  264.94 489.21 2.31 6,574.88
pop1 34,801.23 21,615.08 2,051  152,977
y_cap 125.67 70.64 46.25  601.37
l1 0.51 0.08 0.33  0.79
0 228 
adens 234.23 332.31 2.31  2.318.85
pop1 47,371.21 27,768.71 12,665  133,738
y_cap 208.71 74.68 81.57  404.37
l1 0.56 0.08 0.45  0.85
1 52 
adens 425.81 957.38 6.92  6.574.88
pop1  60,883.23 40,457.36 18,413 262,538
y_cap  188.57 82.69 80.55 368.46
l1  0.54 0.06 0.45 0.70
2 36 
adens  223.62 196.87 14.13 857.99
Source: Based on Census data (IBGE, 2000)  
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We used five specifications, from a simpler one, in which the y* depends only on pop1, to 
a more comprehensive, in which all four explanatory variables comprise the model. We also 
tested specifications using other variables, such as average age, household income, and income of 
the staff employed in administrative positions at dealers. 
The advantage of using the ordered probit model is that it automatically imposes an 
implicit presupposition in the theoretical model, namely that S
M is greater than S
D (i.e., the size of 
the market for monopoly is smaller than the size of the market for duopoly). Considering a 
synthetic model, the coefficients  1 α  and  2 α of the ordered probit model define the probabilities: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
() () () () β α α β α α
β α β α α β α α
β α α β α
x x e x P x y P x y P
x x x e x P x y P x y P
x x e x P x y P x y P
− Φ − = ≤ + ≤ = ≤ = =
− Φ − − Φ = ≤ + ≤ = ≤ = =
− Φ = ≤ + = ≤ = =
3 3 2 3






where y = 1 represents a monopoly, y = 2 a duopoly, and  Φ is the normal distribution.  
The model’s coefficient estimations are shown in Table 10. All coefficients are significant 
at 10%, 5% or 1%, except for the coefficient of the variable “Theil” (but which was nonetheless 
maintained to consider the income distribution effect); moreover, all variables represent the 
expected signal.   
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Table 10: Results of the ordered probit models for determining barriers to the entry of new 
dealers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
pop1 0.0000155  (***)  0.0000193(***) 0.0000196(***) 0.0000228(***)  0.0000225(***)
 (2.95e-06)  (3.17e-06) (3.20e-06) (3.63e-06)  (3.66e-06)
y_cap   0.007032(***) 0.0065633(***) 0.0073345(***)  0.0070018(***)
   (0.0009614) (0.0010124) 0.0009838  (0.001052)
Theil   1.621457   1.004655
   (1.044764)   (1.110083)
adens   -0.0003143(**)  -0.002671(*)
   0.0001498  (0.0001586)
α1  1.257842 2.546358 3.354958 2.657618 3.142829
 (0.1482535)  (0.2488701) (0.5835764) (0.2605346)  (0.599537)
α2  1.960928 3.363532 4.174723 3.484323 3.969582
 (0.1684994)  (0.2751392) (0.5964521) (0.2866102)  (0.6112228)
Log likelihood  -224.4045  -194.25998 -195.28166 -194.25998  -193.85019
Pseudo R
2 0.0643  0.1900 0.1857 0.1900  0.1917
Observações 313  313 313 313  313
Note: (*): Significant at 10%. (**) Significant at 5%. (***) Significant at 1%. The numbers in parenthesis are standard 
deviations. 
The ratio between the coefficients  1 α  and  2 α  and the coefficient of the variable pop1 
define the scales S
M and S
D, i.e., the size of the urban population of the largest city in a micro-
region housing zero, one or two dealers. In the models, according to Table 11, these values are 
approximately 81,000 and 126,000 (in the simplest model) and 140,000 and 175,000 people (in 
the most comprehensive model), which are relatively larger than the magnitudes actually seen. 
According to the database, the average urban population of the largest city in the micro-regions 
housing only one dealer is approximately 47,000, while in cities housing two dealers it is 60,000. 
Yet, if we take the comprehensive model, the proportions remain the same, i.e., S
M/S
D = 
D M S S ˆ / ˆ  
≈ 0.8. 
Table 11: Limit points for the ordered probit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monopoly (S
M)  81,009 131,859 116,436 171,140 139,810
  (8,846) (15,645) (13,136) (32,474) (30,939)
Duopoly (S
D)  126,289 174,176 152,655 212,957 176,589
  (16,520) (21,446) (17,903) (36,323) (34,404)
(S
M/S
D)  0.64 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.79
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Source: Based on Census (IBGE, 2000) and Fenabrave data.  
The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.  
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In addition to the values S
M and S
D, it is necessary to estimate proxies for the variable 
profits V
D and V
M, the derivative of unobservable profit in relation to the demographic variable. 
We know that in the probit model the marginal change of the latent variable in relation to changes 









, where  () () z
dz
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z g =  is the normal distribution.  (G) 
In the ordered probit model, in turn, the marginal effect of the continuous independent 
variables is given by: 
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, for 0 < j < J  (H) 
We computed the marginal effects V
M and V
D for the mean of values x, according to the 
mean values of the variables shown in Table 9
11. The results of the marginal effects for monopoly 
and duopoly in the five specifications are shown in Table 12. There we see that the relation 
between the marginal effects in specification (4) is 0.14. In the simplest model, this relation is 
1.52, while in the most comprehensive model it is 0.28. 
Table 12: The marginal effect of the size of the market on the probability of entry 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monopoly (V
M)  2.53e-06 2.56e-06 3.61e-06 4.23e-06 4.16e-06 
  (1.95e-07) (2.48e-07) (2.58e-07) (3.45e-07) (3.45e-07) 
Duopoly (V
D)  2.51e-06 2.24e-06 2.21e-06 2.57e-06 2.49e-06 
  (2.99e-07) (4.54e-07) (4.62e-07) (6.53e-07) (6.31e-07) 
(V
D/V
M)  0.99 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.60 
  (0.30) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22)  (0.215) 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
                                                 
11 We used the mean of 313 observations, containing 0, 1 or 2 dealers (i.e., the first line of the table in Table 9).  
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The theoretical model assumes, following equations (6) to (8), that the variable profit, 
both in a monopoly as well as in a duopoly, increases linearly with the variable representing the 
size of the market. In the empirical models developed in this paper, the size of the market 
corresponds to the variable “urban population in the largest city of the micro-region” (pop1). The 
marginal effects referring to the variable pop1 in monopoly and duopoly correspond, 
respectively, to the variables V
M and V
D in the theoretical model.  
The ratio between these marginal effects (V
D/V
M) in models (1) to (5) is above 0.5, 
suggesting, not unlike in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), that in the Brazilian case the increase of 
the margin resulting from product differentiation more than offset the decrease in the monopoly 
margin resulting from competition. 
Following equation (8’), if we divide limit points ratio (S
M/S
D) by the marginal effects 
ratio (V
D/V
M), we obtain the fixed costs ratio (F
M/F
D). The estimations are in Table 13. In the 
simpler model, this ratio equals 0.65, showing that the costs of installing a second dealer would 
be approximately 54% higher than for the first dealer. Just as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), we 
cannot attribute this increase in costs directly to the entry barriers. It would be necessary to 
investigate, say, if no differences in cost associated to dealer and manufacturer brands exist.  
Table 13: Ratio between fixed costs of entry in a monopoly and in a duopoly 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(F
M/F
D)  0.65 1.20 1.31 1.26 1.32 
  (0.20) (0.40) (0.44) (0.44) (0.47) 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
Yet the ratio F
M/F
D in all other models is above one, suggesting that in the Brazilian case 
the costs of entry for a second dealer are smaller than those for the first dealer, contrary to the 
findings of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990). For example, using data and specification of the 
comprehensive model (model (5)), the costs of installing a second dealer are approximately 0.76 
times of those necessary to install the first. Comparing with the results of Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1990), in four of the authors’ eight specifications, the costs of entry for the second dealer are 
from 40% to 50% higher than those for the first one.  
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5 5. .   S Su um mm ma ar ry y, ,   c co on nc cl lu us si io on n   a an nd d   i im mp pl li ic ca at ti io on ns s   
This paper investigates if the existence of a dealer in a micro-region represents a barrier to 
the entry of a new dealer into this micro-region. To do so, we organized a database gathering 
information on the location of dealers according to micro-regions, based on Fenabrave data and 
IBGE’s 2000 Census data.  
In a first phase, we identified eight variables that condition the existence and the number 
of dealers in a micro-region: the natural logarithm of the urban population of the largest city in a 
micro-region; the natural logarithm of the remaining population of a micro-region; the natural 
logarithm of the share of women in that population; population density (inhabitants per square 
kilometer); income distribution (as measured by the Theil-L); the natural logarithm of household 
income; wages paid to workers in administrative positions at auto dealers; and average age in 
each micro-region. 
In a second phase, we adapted the Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) model to the Brazilian 
auto-distribution industry. Estimates suggest that the increase of the profit margin resulting from 
product differentiation more than offsets the decrease in the monopoly margin resulting from 
competition, and that the fixed costs of installing a second dealer in monopoly micro-regions are 
lower than the fixed costs necessary to install the first dealer, which suggests the inexistence of 
barriers to the entry of new dealers in monopolized markets.  
The possible confirmation of the inexistence of barriers to the entry of new dealers in 
monopoly markets would strengthen the conclusion that the clause of exclusivity in auto-retail 
contracts – according to which auto dealers cannot sell new vehicles of other brands – apparently 
does not impose major restrictions on the expansion of the country’s dealer network
12.  
Yet one last caveat is that the econometric results arrived at in this paper reflect a 
particular point in time, when we still see the impact of the entry of new automobile 
manufacturers into the dynamics of this industry. For example, the possible adoption of 
                                                 
12 In this aspect, please see Dobson and Waterson, 1996.  
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aggressive distribution policies by these new manufacturers, as the installation of dealers 
following criteria other than short-term economic profit, can be affecting the estimated results. 
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